This paper considers the utility of emigration figures for signalling political dysfunction in Europe. If given a choice, most people would prefer not to leave friends, family and homes in order to find work. By assuming that international migration is more of a burden than a freedom, international migration patterns can help us distinguish between politically successful and politically dysfunctional states. This approach is first applied to international refugees and migrants to the EU, then used to study internal EU migrant flows. In the doing, it creates two sets of rankings (in overall and per-capita terms) for Europe's most and least successful states. Included among the most dysfunctional states in Europe
As noted in the introduction to this special issue, there is a growing recognition that democratic states struggle to maintain their vitality and legitimacy; they appear as politically dysfunctional.
There can be many causes for this perceived dysfunctionality: Jones and Matthijs (2016) point to the important role played by a decline in solidarity; others point to a rescinding faith in democratic institutions (and their capture by economic elites); the hollowing out of national sovereignty by the forces of globalization; the rise of populist, anti-establishment, parties; etc.
The modern democratic state, it seems, has difficulty satisfying the demands of its citizenry.
In Europe, these concerns are often packaged with reference to a democratic deficit. 1 As with other democratic states, only more so, the forces of economic integration have made it difficult for European elected officials (at the national level) to satisfy the economic and political desires of their citizenry. As the EU encourages and facilitates political and economic integration, it necessarily undermines the sovereign reach of its component (and more representative) governments.
I believe that there are two concomitant developments that help to explain political dysfunction in Europe. First, and most obviously: there has been an on-going transfer of political authority from democratically-accountable national parliaments and governments to Europeanwide institutions that are farther removed (e.g. geographically), from the people they represent.
Worse still, many of these EU-level institutions lack democratic legitimacy. Second, Europeans are beginning to feel squeezed by the shrinking democratic scope that accompanies any process of economic liberalization. As governments embrace rules over discretion, they lose discretionary (read democratic) influence over policy and outcomes. In short, democratically-elected governments in Europe are less able to influence their own national contexts, and these very governments are becoming less germane for determining political and economic outcomes in Europe.
Europe's dysfunctionality was clearly evident in its response to the recent financial crisis, as member states and EU officials seem paralyzed by the scope of the challenge. In the face of rising unemployment levels, and the exorbitant costs of bailing out their financial sectors, one member state economy after the other was choked by austerity, for lack of any real policy alternatives. When forced to choose between prioritizing the needs of domestic constituents, or those of the international financial community, Europe's political elite consistently sided with the latter, or were replaced by technocrats when they dithered. 2 Even clear electoral mandates for policy reform, such as the Irish general election in February 2011, were unable to deliver the change they promised. 3 It is no wonder that a majority of Europeans feel that their voice doesn't count in the EU, 4 and a majority of Brits chose exit.
Clearly, if the EU hopes to overcome its democratic deficit, it will need to modify its practices and institutions, such that the voice of European voters can be better heard. Recent efforts to extend the influence of the European Parliament, and to increase transparency in European policymaking, are aimed at these important objectives. While these types of solutions are welcome, they only address one component to the democratic deficit: institutional deficiencies at the EU level. 5 Citizens of Europe's sundry member states are still left with national governments that are losing their sovereign grip. Worse, the very size and heterogeneity of the European Union will complicate any effort to generate democratically-responsive solutions: local challenges will necessarily vary and resist any common solution generated by a distant and larger body in aggregate. 6 While the challenge to representative democracy may be especially evident in Europe, so too is one possible solution. Unlike states in the international system, the European Union offers its residents the right of expatriation: 7 the freedom to vote with their feet, from one member state to another. This freedom provides Europeans with a democratic safety valve and the opportunity to retract consent from one government (and grant it to another). This right of expatriation is a costly one-in that most people will not resort to it if they enjoy access to other channels of influence-but it is a significant one, linked to the heart of the European project. It is important to note that migration is neither a simple nor an easy solution. Most people will prefer to remain near their friends and family, and secure their livelihoods under familiar conditions. Voting or protest will almost always trump migration in the initial calculations of dissatisfied citizens. In this light, we can assume that migration is a desperate political act; it is a decision that is not made lightly; and we can expect it only after several other options have been tried and proved unsuccessful. As exit is extremely costly (e.g., emotionally, financially, socially), the signal it sends should not be discounted or ignored.
The way I have framed this problem is borrowed from Albert Hirschman, whose work has been an inspiration for me on several earlier occasions (AUTHOR 2005; .
Hirschman wished to provide decision-makers with the sort of information they need to reform their organizations, in the face of what he assumed was the inevitability of entropy. For
Hirschman, all organizations-whether they are states, firms, political parties, etc.-are prone to entropy: they need to adapt constantly, or risk eventual demise. For this reason, decision-makers need to rely on the signals sent by dissatisfied consumers of the goods they provide (whether they are the rights of citizenship, the quality of a service provided, or the nature of a political platform to be embraced). I am proposing that we do the same: rather than seeing migrants as a potential threat to democracy, we can use them to gauge the quality of government in (and its variance across) Europe.
This sort of political signalling is also the hallmark of so-called Tiebout studies, 14 which gauge how citizens choose among competing packages of locally-provided public goods (tax levels, quality of schools and parks, zoning policies, etc.). In Tiebout studies, local governments are assumed to be responsive to local populations and they offer sundry packages of government services, each at a different price (tax rate). 15 Mobile citizens choose the particular tax/services package that best fits their needs/preferences by moving to that location. In the doing, mobile citizens sort themselves into optimum communities (i.e., some of us prefer more developed (read expensive) welfare states; other prefer less so).
In either framework, migration trends reveal important signals about political preference-signals that are akin to (and maybe even more effective than) voting. Because
European citizens are free to move around the continent unhindered, 16 we can use this movement to gauge the degree to which European states satisfy their citizens' needs (and which do not). In this context, Europe provides an interesting prototype of how we might strengthen democratic influence by allowing exit to fortify voice in facilitating change.
MIGRATION PATTERNS IN EUROPE
In this section we examine the nature of migration patterns in Europe, from an 'exit as voice'
perspective. This examination contains three parts. We begin by looking at the character of external migration (asylum flows) to the European Union. This examination is brief, in that it requires little elaboration: by breaking down and examining the external migration flows, we can clearly see which states in the global system are dysfunctional, and which states in Europe are most attractive.
The second section then zeros-in on those European countries that are attracting the most (internal and external) migrants. If we interpret migration as a signalling device by those revealing their political preferences, these states offer Europe's most attractive citizenship bundles. The third section then turns to the EU member states that are shedding citizens. These states can be identified as the EU's most dysfunctional states.
Asylum Patterns
We begin by tracking asylum applicants to Europe, as the resulting pattern provides an unambiguous case of political signalling. In these circumstances it is clear that people are voting with their feet: people are fleeing political persecution and repression, and seeking to stake out a new life under better circumstances. Where did these migrants seek refuge? One might expect that geographic proximity (to the state of origin) is an important consideration when seeking asylum, but the ranking in Table 1 suggests otherwise. Asylum-seekers recognize that some states are more generous and provide better protections than others, and they tailor their asylum applications accordingly. In terms of overall numbers, the most attractive states for asylum-seekers are Germany, France, Sweden,
Italy and the United Kingdom (in that order). 
Europe's Magnet States
In 2013, a little more than 3.4 million people had immigrated to EU member states, with the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and France being the largest destination countries (in that order). 18 In the UK, for instance, most of the immigrants were citizens of Poland (14.8%), followed by India, While interesting, these figures and rankings are far too rough for our purposes, as they include return immigrants and immigrants from non-EU member states. Indeed, in several countries (e.g. Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), a majority of the immigrants in 2013 were nationals returning home. In other countries (Italy, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Sweden), the majority of immigrants in 2013 were from non-EU states.
If we focus solely on the immigrants from other EU member states, the total number of EU immigrants shrinks to just 1.2 million people, or about 0.24% (i.e. less than a quarter of one percent) of the total (EU-28) population in 2013. 20 When we examine the national backgrounds of these (internal) EU migrants, then the geographic pattern varies slightly from the overall immigration trends described above. Figure 2a lists European states in order of the number of immigrants in 2013 who were citizens of (other) EU-28 member states. 21 Here we see that the most attractive destinations included large states (Germany and the UK), but also Switzerland (which is a non-EU member state, and relatively small).
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Figure 2 (a and b) about here
The pattern becomes even more surprising when we weigh these internal EU-immigration figures by the total population, and rank the states accordingly (as is done in Figure 2b ). In light of the discussion from the previous section, this is probably the best indicator for capturing those states that offer the most attractive citizenship bundles for EU citizens voting with their feet.
In Figure 2b Table 2 , to ease comparisons. Here we can see that foreigners seem to be attracted to large, relatively wealthy states with robust economies (such as Germany and the UK, with Spain being the possible exception). These are the same states that are attracting asylum seekers, as we saw in Table 1 .
Indeed, there is a surprising degree of overlap across the list of top five states receiving asylum seekers and immigrants from the EU-28. The two surprises, I would say, are Sweden (among asylum havens) and Switzerland (as an EU-28 magnet): as these are both relatively small states. Figure 3 ranks Europe's most dysfunctional states, in terms of total number of emigrants, and as a percentage of the home population. In Figure 3a , we find that the EU's largest overall exporter of citizens was Romania (2,271,379!), followed by Poland, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. 26 When we examine more closely where emigrants were choosing to re-settle, we find that the top ten destinations for all of these countries were remarkably similar: relatively wealthy states, with developed markets such as Switzerland, Austria, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, etc.
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Figure 3 (and b) about here
For our purposes, it is more interesting to look at the share of the population in any country that seems to be dissatisfied with conditions at home. Figure 3b provides the best measure of Europe's most dysfunctional states, in that it lists states in terms of their per-capita emigration rates to other EU member states. When this is done, we see a large number of states that appear unable to provide for their citizens' needs. I find it astonishing that almost 11 percent of Romania's population (over 2 million people!) is now living in another EU member state! The share of Lithuanians, Irish, Croatian and Latvians who have left home in search of better conditions is lower, but equally shocking. For whatever reason, these countries are not able to satisfy the needs of a significant share of their population.
We can now see which states in Europe are able to attract mobile Europeans and which states are repelling them. In the next section we consider whether it is reasonable to attach political significance to this internal mobility. Does the flow of migrants within the EU signal the ineffectiveness of voice across Europe?
EXIT AS VOICE
To what extent is it reasonable to interpret exit in Europe as a form of political voice? This section tries to answer that tricky question by looking at how emigration relates to several economic and political variables. Given the exploratory nature of this project, and the remarkable paucity of data, I rely on simple bivariate scatter plots to consider the degree to which political and economic indicators of strife are related to per capita emigration figures (to other EU member states).
Economic Variables
When applied to economic conditions, the argument for exit as voice rests on two, related,
observations.
First, we should recognize that states in Europe lack many of the discretionary tools that were once used to secure full employment and economic stability (AUTHOR 2015). To facilitate economic integration (and consistent with the neoliberal economic logic that drives it), the EU has slowly outlawed the sort of protectionist measures that states once used to achieve domestic economic growth (e.g. public procurement projects, infant industry protections, local content requirements and industrial policies, etc.). More obvious has been the need to jettison domestic monetary policy (and politically-responsive central banks) as part of the effort to secure a monetary union in Europe. Now, in the wake of the recent crisis, additional constraints are being drawn up to limit the capacity of states to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policies. 28 In short, member states can no longer employ the policy instruments that they have traditionally used to secure economic stability. As a result, politicians find themselves at the mercy of market conditions.
This brings me to the second point. As member states are no longer able to manage their domestic economies, elected officials can no longer be held accountable for economic failure.
Consequently, the outcomes of national elections mean less for the national economy-as the most relevant policy decisions are now being made in Frankfurt or Brussels. If national policymakers have less influence over real economic outcomes, then there is less incentive to influence them by traditional channels of voice (voting, lobbying, public advocacy, etc.). In this context, exit is more effective than voice in securing (personally) preferable economic outcomes (at least in the short-term).
Imagine you are a citizen of contemporary Greece, in the midst of a deep economic crisis, and mainstream political elites are informing you that the only possible remedy is an internal devaluation, or wage squeeze, which will likely take several years before it has the desired effect on your country's international competitiveness. As a citizen of Greece, what can you do to improve your circumstances? You might vote for more populist and/or radical parties, only to find that they cannot deliver what they promise; you could protest and/or abstain from the mainstream political process, but this hardly changes matters on the ground. It seems to me that there are only two options available: stay and suffer (while you pray for long-term improvements); or leave for greener pastures. In this context, exit represents a vote against the status quo. Migrants are demonstrating that they lack confidence in the ability of elected officials to turn things around-and are heading out on their own (despite the significant personal costs incurred).
To examine the relationship between economic mismanagement and emigration, Figure 4 provides scatter plots of the level of internal EU migration (emigration/population, as depicted in Figure 3b , above), and a series of economic variables. My intent with these scatterplots is not to exaggerate causal linkages, but to provide readers with an opportunity to see the general patterns, and how individual member states relate to these patterns. On offer is a simple, initial investigation-not a formal test or argument.
Figure 4 (a,b,c,d) about here
In each of the four panels that make up Figure 4 , we see a clear relationship, in the expected direction: emigrants are fleeing contexts that are characterized by poorer economic management (or the perception of such). While some of the relationships are stronger than others (GDP/capita; perceptions of the national economy), the overall picture is clear. 29 Per capita emigration, to another EU member state, is highest in those member states that suffer relatively more unemployment and national poverty, and it is highest in those countries where citizens are most sceptical about the state of the country's economic strength and its capacity for economic management. Emigrants from Europe's most dysfunctional states are clearly fleeing from their home state's inability to secure economic opportunity and/or stability. These emigrants lack confidence in the ability of their elected officials to correct the problem, and their exit signals a vote of no-confidence.
Having said that, given the depth of the economic crisis, I find it remarkable that the level of internal migration within the EU is not even greater, and recent studies have confirmed that economically-motivated migration in Europe is not as prevalent as one might expect (e.g. Recchi 2015: 45-6). When we look closer at the overall stock of European immigrants in the EU over time, as is done in Figure 5 , 30 then we see that the number of internal (EU) immigrants took-off in 1999, and got a boost in 2005. It is important to note that this increase was driven by the EU's expansion eastward, and the access to (western) labour markets that it provided. The post 2008 growth trend is still high, and may have increased in recent years, but it is not significantly higher than we saw in the pre-crisis years. When we consider the immigration figures for some of the larges states in Europe (in the stacked columns beneath the line), we see the largest growth seems to be occurring in Spain, Italy and the UK.
Figure 5 about here
Political Variables
The political argument for exit as voice is tangential to the economic argument outlined above, but much broader in scope. Here too, we expect migrants to be aware of the reduced effectiveness of political sovereignty at the member state level-but now the sovereign scope extends to broader concerns (than just the economy). In effect, emigration can be read as a sign of political alienation or frustration: citizens abandon hope of trying to influence policymakers to improve conditions at home, and seek refuge abroad.
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If citizens feel like they have no voice, or that their voice is not being heard, we might expect them to avoid the ballot box, have diminished trust in the national government, be dissatisfied with the democratic quality of their home government and presume that their voice doesn't count. Figure 6 considers each of these relationships.
As in the previous figure, Figure 6 provides four different panels that relate emigration figures (per capita) with a number of variables related to political alienation. Here too, we find that the relationships are as hypothesized, and in some of these scatter plots the relationships appear to be remarkably strong. For example, in Figure 5a we see that the almost 40% of the variance in emigration rates can be explained by a single variable: voter turn-out levels in the preceding decade (R 2 = 0.3789). There are also clear links between the relative size of the emigrant diaspora and the level of dissatisfaction with the nature of democracy at home (Figure   6c ), and the belief that their voice is not being heard at home (Figure 6d ). Although the correspondence is weaker, we can also see how emigration is inversely related to trust in national governments ( Figure 6b ).
Figure 6 (a,b,c,d) about here
In all of these scatter plots, we find the level of emigration to be highest in those countries where we find a greater sense of political alienation and frustration. In light of these exploratory findings, it doesn't seem unreasonable to read emigration as a kind of political voice, enunciating political frustration about the dysfunctional states from which they flee.
When we remember that the list of dysfunctional states is topped by Romania, Lithuania, Ireland, Croatia, Latvia and Portugal, it seems clear that citizens from these countries are escaping the economic fallout from the Eurozone crisis. These emigrants recognize that their national governments can do little (or are willing to do little) to generate the economic growth (and jobs) they need. Left to their own devices, citizens leave their dysfunctional states and head off to greener pastures. When one considers the kind of states to which they are fleeing: small states, with strong economies, many of which are outside the EU (and its Eurozone), then the lesson becomes even more pronounced.
Indeed, case evidence from Romania suggests it is not unreasonable to interpret the emigrant population as politically dissatisfied, and Romanian democracy as dysfuncational.
When provided an opportunity to vote, the Romanian diaspora tends to support the opposition centre-right parties and candidates (Burean 2011; and Burean and Popp 2015) . This influence became especially evident in the 2015 elections, when Klaus Iohannis managed to become President with the help of a motivated diaspora community, voting through foreign embassies:
obtaining 89% of the emigrant vote, thus securing a 4% gain over his opponent (The Economist
2014; Burean and Popp 2015: 2).
On the other hand, the timing of the immigration spurt, as seen in Figure 5 , suggest that the growth may be fuelled by something else. Recchi (2015: 52) suggests that the motivation may be political: that the take-off occurs at a time when visa requirements for Eastern Europe were being removed, and they had free access to Western Europe as new EU member states.
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The data are too sparse to test this conclusively.
CONCLUSIONS
I have suggested that many citizens in Europe have given up on voice as an instrument of democratic influence. It would seem that elected officials at the member state level lack the tools, or the will, to secure better conditions at home. Clearly, citizens in Europe need stronger tools to influence political outcomes. Exit is one possibility, and Europeans are lucky to enjoy it. This paper has suggested that Europeans are using this opportunity to signal their dissatisfaction with political leadership. The empirical evidence, although it is rough, suggests that this is not an unreasonable interpretation: emigration is clearly related to the sort of economic and political variables that are consistent with the argument.
I have been careful not to overstretch the argument. I recognize that some migration in
Europe is motivated by non-political factors. The British immigrants to Spain are a case in point.
I am also sympathetic to the notion, often made by EU officials, that migration represents a real opportunity (and a fourth freedom!). But it is important to bridle this political rhetoric, as it seems that most Europeans are not leaving home to expand their cultural horizons or to embrace their new European identities. Rather, Europeans are being forced to leave home because their governments are unable to meet expectations. In a context where vote is seen to be ineffective, Europeans are turning to exit as a means to voice political discontent.
I have begun to trace out the relationship with a series of very simple scatter plots. More sophisticated empirical tests are possible, but this is really not necessary. 33 It should not be controversial to argue that people flee desperate situations, when given the opportunity. Rather, the point of this paper is to draw attention to the political consequences that should follow in the wake of these internal migration flows. The existence of these emigration patterns is consistent with an argument that voice in Europe is not working like it should, and that local (national) officials are either unwilling or unable to provide stable economic and political conditions at home.
Europeans are lucky and privileged to have recourse to exit, but they would be luckier still if they had governments that could deliver the sort of economic and political conditions that would allow their citizens to stay at home, near friends and family. By examining migration tends we can focus attention on the shortcomings of some EU member states; with hopes of shaming them into providing more for their citizens. In other words, I hope to leverage citizen influence by focusing on the signalling effect of exit. Total Asylum Applicants, 2008-14, My voice doesn't count, 2012 26 Having learned that countries outside of the EU were receiving many of the EU-28 emigrants, I calculated the emigrant flow to the EU-27 and to Greater Europe (which included the EU-27, plus Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland). The patterns were remarkably similar, with only Portugal and France trading places among the top five emigration sites. 27 The outlier was the UK, whose top emigration destination was Spain. I will leave it up to the reader to speculate as to the nature of this emigrant stream.
28 By way of the two-pack, the six-pack, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), etc. For clarification of these terms, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm 29 I have imposed linear regression lines on all the subsequent figures, even though it is possible to see an exponential or polynomial (2 nd order) relationship in much of the data. Indeed, in several figures (4a, 4c, 4d, 6c and 6d) a curvilinear relationship explains (slightly) more of the variance. This is not a problem: an exponential relationship is consistent with the proposed argument, in that we can expect the number of emigrants to increase proportionally once a frustration threshold is breached (i.e., migrants first try and employ voice, then turn to exit when voice proves ineffective). On many of the scatter plots, Greece appears as an outlier, clearly affecting the slope of the regression line. As this is only a first pass at the data, future analyses should employ a more fine-toothed approach. 30 The Eurostat site does not post time series data on emigration, it takes down figures from earlier years, when posting new data. For this reason, I'm grateful to Ettore Recchi for sharing his data with me, as he has been collecting it over time. 31 While I have been emphasizing the ineffectiveness of voice (alone), it is important to point out that internal migrants in Europe do enjoy local and European Parliament voting rights in their new host countries. It is only in national elections (whose sovereign scope is shrinking) that the European immigrant is disenfranchised-otherwise, s/he will continue to enjoy the same voting right as locals. Indeed, the naturalization rates of mobile European citizens in EU member states are close to zero (Reichel 2011) . For the national particulars, across the EU, see Your Europe (2014). To learn more about the electoral rights of third country citizens in the EU, see Arrighi et al. (2014, Table 1, pp. 22-23) . 32 'To a larger extent, the boom was driven by the expectation of the enlargement of 2004 and 2007 ' (Recchi 2015 . This doesn't fit the data, actually, as the visa requirements were lifted in 2002, and the spurt began in 1999. 33 Rather than develop more sophisticated empirical tests of the nature of the relationship between political/economic failures and emigration, the next stage of research should zero-in on individual migrant motivations-to better document the political signals being sent by migrants, and to shine light on these (thereby amplifying the voice, being projected by exit).
